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HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY 
CHALLENGES 
Steven Lenahan  
Executive Officer: Corporate Affairs - AngloGold Ashanti Limited 
¶1 In November 2004, AngloGold Ashanti deployed a team of geologists and 
administrative staff, supported by an unarmed, private security crew, in the town of 
Mongbwalu, in the Ituri region in the northeastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC).  In January 2005, our colleagues in Mongbwalu were victim to an 
act of extortion and were forced to pay to a militia group, the Front for National 
Integration (the FNI), the sum of $8,000. This incident attracted the perfectly 
justified attention of a wide range of human rights and multi- lateral agencies and, 
predictably, the media.  My intention today is not to focus on this incident or to 
apologize for it, but rather to reflect on what we as a company have taken away 
from our experiences in Ituri, with the hope that we all can derive benefit from 
them. 
¶2 Ashanti Goldfields, which later was to merge with AngloGold to form AngloGold 
Ashanti in 2004, left its gold-rich concession around Mongbwalu in 1998, when it 
became clear that what was to become the second civil war in the country would 
make commercial activity in the region impossible. 
¶3 Between 1998 and late 2003, it was self-evident to anybody with even the most 
rudimentary appreciation of current affairs that ordinary life or commerce would be 
impossible in the eastern Congo.  However, by the end of 2003, political 
developments suggested to Ashanti that consideration should be given to the 
prospect of a new exploration programme in Concession 40, aimed at the 
possibility of a far larger, more sustained operation than had been undertaken 
before, perhaps resulting in the establishment of a modern, large scale gold mine.  
In particular, management’s attention was focused on assessing the level of risk 
associated with an exploration project in what remained, at that time, a politically 
sensitive region.  The company was as aware of the degree of conflict in the eastern 
DRC as could reasonably be expected and of the allegations of widespread 
violation of human rights by a number of militia groups active in the area.  Initially, 
despite being urged by transitional Government ministers to return to Mongbwalu, 
no doubt in the interests of both state revenues and economic development, Ashanti 
did no more than send investigating teams there and continue to canvass the views 
of informed sources, including government officials and MONUC personnel. 
¶4 Ultimately, however, in November of 2004, an exploration base was indeed 
established and drilling began.  The judgment, on balance, at that time, based on the 
views of a wide range of stakeholders, was that there was an appreciable measure 
of risk associated with the venture, but that it was manageable.  This is the nature of 
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risk assessment, is it not?  I work in downtown Johannesburg, considered by many 
people to be one of the riskiest urban settings in the world in respect of violent 
crime.  Plainly, the assessment of these people of the level of the threat and its 
consequences is different from mine and some 450 of my colleagues. 
¶5 For the record, we did not, in coming to the conclusion that exploration in 
Mongbwalu was plausible, either establish a relationship with any militia grouping 
nor did we seek their permission for our activities.  That the FNI may have 
interpreted and communicated their conclusions in that way is, frankly, their affair. 
¶6 In any case, events proved that we had got our timing wrong and that, consequently 
and with the benefit of retrospect, our assessment of the manageability of the risk 
had been (again on balance) flawed.  In January 2005, our colleagues in 
Mongbwalu were forced to pay to the FNI a sum of $8,000.  We knew, at that time 
and now, that this was quite obviously inconsistent with both our own business 
principles and commonly accepted conventions for the protection of human rights.  
We reported the incident widely in the DRC and to the UN structures there.  When 
interrogated by the media, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, a British All Part 
Parliamentary Group and the NGO Human Rights Watch, we freely communicated 
the steps we had taken, the events which led up to the incident and the steps we 
would be taking to avoid a repetition. 
¶7 That, as they say, is now history and the incident, though regrettable, did not 
materially alter the course of events in Ituri.  It did, however, lead to a very 
thorough analysis within AngloGold Ashanti of our risk assessment processes, our 
guidelines for managing in sensitive zones, our stakeholder engagement processes 
and, importantly, our view of our role in local and regional economic development 
and the growth of democracy.  It also led to what has become a helpful engagement 
with our critics – particularly HRW and the UN’s Group of Experts.  So, what have 
we learned and what are we doing in Ituri now? 
¶8 First, transparency continues to be a cornerstone of our business principles, 
particularly where we know that our activities are, in any event, under scrutiny.  
This is as much the case with respect to investment analysts’ interest in our 
operating and financial performance as it is with human rights NGOs’ concerns 
about our presence in the Congo.  We are active participants in the EITI in all 
countries where the government has decided to subscribe to this initiative’s 
principles and processes.  Our annual “Report to Society,” while far from perfect, is 
generally acknowledged to be good practice.  But transparency must go beyond this 
institutional approach – it has to be part of regular day-to-day management.  At 
Mongbwalu now, every time there is some form of interaction of any kind with any 
third party, from the mayor to the local commander of the MONUC force stationed 
in the town, a record is made and, regularly and frequently, a summary of these 
interactions is shared with executive management, local politicians, the United 
Nations and our partners, OKIMO.  Apart from the obvious benefits of this 
practice, it has the effect of making operating management reflect on their proposed 
actions before committing to a process; before he agrees to meet a local business 
owner or a political party leader, the manager asks himself, “Will I be happy for my 
corporate office, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC and HRW to know about 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 7  
 342
this meeting?”  If the answer is positive, there’s a good chance that it passes the test 
of consistency with our business values. 
¶9 That leads me to our second concern – integrity.  We have persistently said about 
our activities in all sensitive areas (and particularly in the DRC and in Colombia, 
where we also have exploration projects and where we recognize the associated 
risk) that, if we are not able to do business in these places with integrity, we will 
leave.  That is not an idle threat, either to the respective governments, our 
shareholders or those advocacy groups who watch us.  What we are saying is that if 
it becomes clear to us that local conditions have changed to the extent that it is not 
possible to act within the boundaries of our own business principles, we will go.  
This requires, of course, that we are satisfied internally that these business 
principles are consistent with our own general ethical standards.  Secondly, we are 
active in and are guided by a wide range of industry and multi-stakeholder 
initiatives which have been established to develop standards and assurance 
processes for corporations committed to responsible business practice in the 
extractive industries.  These include the Global Compact, the International Council 
on Mining and Metals’ sustainable development principles, the EITI, International 
Alert’s Conflict-Sensitive Business Practices Guidance for Extractive Industries, 
the IFC and World Bank standards, the Council for Responsible Jewellery Practice 
and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. 
¶10 Third, we have taken the necessary steps to become a formal subscriber to the 
Voluntary Principles.  These, as you probably all know, were developed out of a 
multi-stakeholder process involving governments, resource companies and NGOs 
in late 2000 as a means of helping companies in the extractive sector to improve 
their performance in finding the balance between ensuring the security of their 
assets and respect for the human rights of host communities and other stakeholders. 
The secretariat to the Voluntary Principles is presently provided jointly by the 
International Business Leaders Forum in London and Business for Social 
Responsibility in San Francisco.  The next step for us in this process is the 
integration of these principles into the training programs of all security staff and 
into contracts between ourselves and private security contractors on our operations 
world-wide.  This process is under way. 
¶11 Prior to the events of January 2005, AngloGold Ashanti in Mongbwalu had, 
consistent with its corporate social responsibility programs elsewhere, established 
initiatives to address the consequences of poverty and war in the region.  On our 
mining operations globally, we are guided by a rough formula of providing funding 
for social development programs to the tune of approximately 1% of the profits 
generated by an operation.  This is plainly an inappropriate approach in a case, such 
as Mongbwalu, which does not yet generate cash, but consumes it at a rate of some 
$8 to 10 million a year. In the period immediately after January 2005, management 
asked every organization or leader to whom we spoke in Ituri whether, in their 
candid view, we should cease our activities there and go and, if not, what should we 
do better.  The view was unanimous.  We should stay, but we should ensure that we 
were more visible in the community and we should establish structures which 
ensure that our development initiatives enjoyed a reasonable degree of consensus in 
the surrounding communities.  The outcome of the consequent work has been the 
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establishment of a forum on which 23 different community groupings, from 
women’s groups to the pygmies who populate the rain forests are represented.  This 
group initiates projects, considers the company’s proposals and oversees the 
establishment and management of programs.  It is also intended to be the vehicle 
through which the disbursement of foreign donor aid in the community is directed.  
For instance, a World Bank project involving education and health care is currently 
being considered by the forum. 
¶12 Discussions with leading aid and development agencies in the DRC have also 
focused on initiating collaboration between the private sector (as a source of both 
financial resources and project management capacity), the NGO community, aid 
agencies, the government and, very importantly, our host communities to ensure 
that funds raised are appropriately disbursed and the projects are effectively 
executed.  The pressing problem of artisanal and small-scale mining (or ASM), 
while it is also the subject of internal research by AngloGold Ashanti, requires the 
collaborative attention of a multilateral grouping. 
¶13 At the heart of all of this activity, you will notice, is the proposition that the 
communities with which we work are more than passive beneficiaries.  For the 
development programs about which we are talking to succeed, they have to be the 
product of real partnerships, in which foreign and local capital combine with 
communities and local government to ensure the sustained success of these 
programs. Begging bowl benevolence is pointless.  There is no Santa Claus. 
¶14 These have been the central issues emerging from our experiences in the Congo.  In 
some cases, it was a matter of learning from our mistakes.  It’s one of our corporate 
mantras that, this side of heaven, everyone makes mistakes.  The wisdom is in 
admitting having made them and learning from them.  In other instances, there 
were processes and programs in place and all that was needed was some time for 
them to develop before yielding real results.  We have, after all, been in the mining 
business for a while. 
¶15 But I must conclude with some comments on the role of the private sector in social 
and political development in a general sense.  This is a topic with which we, as a 
South African and an African corporate citizen, have some experience.  In the 
confused and often very violent final days of the emergence of a new South African 
constitution and our first democratic election, parts of South Africa were rent by 
ethnic and political divisions and violence.  It was tempting then for businesses to 
walk away from these regions on the reasonable basis that their presence there was 
unhelpful and that their staff was in peril.  They did not.  My own company at the 
time, Anglo American, actively engaged the constitutional, peace-keeping and 
electoral process.  Why did we do that?  Frankly, for the same reason that we did 
not leave the Congo early in 2005.  I am not being disingenuous.  We are a publicly 
traded company with the purpose of creating wealth for our shareholders. But, the 
growth and defense of democracy, the protection of human rights and the 
eradication of poverty are also dependent on successful commerce and economic 
development.  Foreign donor aid, the advancement of the protection of ordinary 
people by advocacy organizations and corporate benevolence are also part of the 
solution and these noble efforts must continue.  However, without foreign direct 
investment, the development of local human capital and the establishment of a 
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sustainable economy based on the country’s rich resource, energy and agricultural 
endowment, there will be little hope for the people of Ituri in the long-term. 
